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Abstract: In the present essay we undertake the comparison of three federations, the 
ancient Greek Achaean, with the modern Indian and the European Union (EU). We 
elaborate a set of criteria, democratization and cohesion, which include each four sub-
criteria, in order to analyse the institutional set-up of the federations. We compare the 
three federations according to three criteria and conclude that the Achaean ranks first 
as to democratization, being the most democratic, with the EU a distant third, while as 
to cohesion, the Achaean and Indian rank close together, with the EU again a distant 
third.  
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Introduction 
 During the May 2014 elections for the European Parliament, growing citizens 
dissatisfaction with the EU was manifest Euroscepticism is on the rise in all 28 EU 
member-states. For example, in France and Great Britain anti-European parties came 
first, in Greece the right-wing party “Golden Dawn” took 9.5% of total votes, while 
even in Germany, which is probably the state which actually benefits the most from 
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the EU and the European Monetary Union (EMU) the anti-European political party 
Alternative für Deutschland took 7 of Germany's 96 seats for the European Parliament 
(2.070.014 votes).  
Europeans consider more and more that there is a grave democratization and 
thus legitimization lack in the EU, and also a lack of solidarity and cohesion. Thus, 
growing euroscepticism. As we will show, under the two criteria we propose for the 
analysis of federations, democratization and cohesion, these perceptions are 
unfortunately correct. The discussion of federations and democracy issues are current 
in most countries, and dissatisfaction is rising in many of them.
1
 This discussion 
started in the ancient Greek democracy, both in theory through the works of Plato’s 
Republic (Book VI) Aristotle’s Politics, (Book 6, 1316b-1323a) Thucydides’ History, 
(Funeral Oration) Xenophon’s, the Polity of the Athenians, ch. 1, Polybius’ Histories, 
(Book 2), and Plutarch’s Life of Aratus (Book XI)2 and in practice, culminating in the 
great Greek proto-federations, most prominent among them the Boeotian (central 
Greece), Aetolian (western and central Greece) and the Achaean one (Peloponnesian 
peninsula).         
 These three ancient Greek federations were successful and long lasting (about 
250 years till the Roman conquest of Greece) and were an inspiration for later ones, as 
for the American Founding Fathers.
3
 They solved efficiently the main federation 
problems, as for example in establishing a noble balance between the central authority 
and the autonomy of constituent city-states.      
 In the next section we present briefly the institutional setup of the Achaean 
federation. Then, we present in a table a comparative presentation of three federal 
states, the Achaean proto-federation, with the two modern ones, India the European 
Union, and for the evaluation we make use of two criteria, democratization and 
cohesion, which again consist of a set of four sub-criteria each. Using these criteria, 
                                                          
1
 We have the impression that dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy and political parties 
exists also in India: See Kejriwal (2010) and Karunakaran (2014). 
2
 The first ever discussion on the merits and demerits of different political regimes is to be found in the 
fictitious discussion of noble Persians, as to which is the best. Thus, Herodotus is not only the father of 
history, but also of political science (Her. Hist. III.80-82 ). 
3
 On the influence of the Greek federation on the American Founding Fathers, as seen also through the 
Federalist Papers, see Ghinard (1940) and Gummere (1962). 
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we attempt a ranking of these federations in order to see if, by their institutional 
functioning could be used as a benchmark for developing current political and 
economic institutions for the European Union (EU) in its steps towards becoming a 
true federal state. 
 
The Achaean federation 
 
The Achaean federation was established in 280 BC, but an older alliance of 
city-states of the North-Western Peloponnese comprising 12 members is attested 
already during the 5
th
 century and may have served as a model for the Achaean 
federation (Rathjen, 1965). The main reason for its establishment, as was the case also 
for the other major contemporary federations, was defense mainly against the 
Macedonian kingdom.         
 The federation increased from 10 members in 280 BC, to as many as 50 
members later. It developed from a previous regional federation, by the voluntary 
adhesion of city-states all over the Northern and Central Peloponnese including such 
important ones like Sikyon (251 BC), Corinth (243 BC), Megalopolis (capital of the 
ex-Arcadian federation, 235 BC) and Argos (229 BC). (Polybius, Histories 2. 41; 
Caspari, 1914, Griffith, 1935, Russel and Cohn, 2012). The Achaean federation was a 
major political force in Greece, trying to balance Macedonian and Spartan power in a 
series of wars and shifting alliances, being successful in safeguarding its city-states 
independence against both powers. It was abolished after resisting Roman 
encroachment, being decisively beaten by the Romans at the battle of Leukopetra in 
146 BC, and the destruction of Corinth.      
 This is not only spelled the end of the federation, but the end of Greek 
independence and the abolishment of democratic regimes. Achaea formed during the 
first century BC a roman province (Badian, 1952; Oliver, 1978).  
 
2.1 Political organisation  
The main contemporary source concerning the federation is Polybius, but the 
information he provides has led modern historians sometimes to different 
interpretations. The main institutional bodies of the Achaean federation were the 
Assembly, to which all citizens of all constituting city-states aged 30 and above could 
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participate (Pol. Hist. 29. 23-35; 29. 24.6; Larsen, 1972). Apparently, the Assembly 
was called for specific purposes within the years, to decide on specific important 
issues.           
 Possibly, the Assembly was called once a year during April-May, which may 
be an indication that strategic matters for the year were discussed and decided upon, 
since spring (April) was usually the beginning of the campaigning season during 
ancient times. A second political body was the Synodos or Boule (meaning the 
Council), which may have been a preparatory body which set-up the agenda for the 
Assembly's meeting, having perhaps as a model the Athenian Boule (Pol. Hist. 2. 46. 
6). It appears though, that for the period 217-200 BC, the Assembly decided on issues 
of great importance like war and alliances, and delegated day to day affairs of the 
federation to the Boule. The members of the boule were elected representatives of the 
city-states (Larsen, 1972, pp. 178-180). If this interpretation is correct, then we have, 
for the first time in history, a mixed democratic system combining elements of direct 
democracy, the Assembly, with elements of representative democracy, the Boule.  
 The reason for the development of this dual system must have been that as the 
federation increased in size, distances became longer, thus making the participation of 
simple citizens costly and time consuming. The distance for example from the city of 
Patra to the capital of  the federation, Aegion, is about 100 km, and from Megalopolis 
to Aigion more or less the same, necessitating if one takes account of the roads of the 
period, at least three days and likely four or five on foot to travel to Aigion (Caspari, 
1914; Briscoe, 1974).         
 It seems also, that the federation did not provide its citizens with a 
remuneration for participating in the Assembly as was the case in classical Athens. It 
is not known if this was a conscious political decision, or was due to an economic 
impossibility to provide funds for this participation, but the result was that in the 
Assembly more prosperous citizens tended to be overrepresented (Briscoe, 1974). On 
the other hand, since members of the Boule were voted locally in their city-states, 
they were the more representative of all citizens.     
 At the beginning, the Assembly met at the federation's capital, Aigion, but 
later on, General Philopoemen established a system under which the Assembly met 
periodically also in other member city-states like Argos. The other institutional bodies 
of the federation were elected by the Assembly. First, among them was the Strategos, 
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(the General), who was combining the offices of supreme military commander of the 
military forces, and of political head of the federation, reminding somewhat the de 
facto position of George Washington during 1776-1783, or Napoleon during 1798-
1814. Under the General, a governing body of a 10 member Council, called 
synarchontes, undertook the day to day administration. Further, three military 
commanders, the ipostrategos (major-general) the hipparchos, head of the cavalry, 
and navarchos (admiral) served under the general. Ancient sources attest also the 
existence of a grammateus (“secretary”) who may have been responsible for the 
“paperwork” of the federation, like the Assembly's and the Boule's decrees and laws 
(Larsen, 1972).          
 A very important element of the federation, was the isopoliteia of its citizens, 
meaning that a citizen of one member city-state, had political rights as a citizen, if he 
moved into another member city-state, a situation that clearly surpasses today’s 
European Union. A Portuguese moving for example to Germany, does not get 
automatically voting rights at German federal elections, as would be the case say, for 
a citizen of Patras moving to Megalopopolis, who were both members of the Achaean 
federation. Another innovative institutional element was the establishment of some 
kind of a Federal Court of Justice.       
 Usually, such court(s) were empowered to solve political differences arising 
among member city-states, taking over a role of intermediation. Usually, a third 
member city-state was chosen for this task, as for example Megara in a dispute 
between Corinth and Epidaurus, or Patras between Thourioi and Megalopolis. 
Sometimes, a body of more than one city undertook this task, as for example 11 cities 
intermediating in litigation between Epidaurus and Arsinoe (Ager, 1996). The Federal 
Court(s) were also responsible for some criminal and property rights cases (possibly 
involving citizens of different member city-states (Larsen, 1972, p. 82). 
 Polybius goes as far as to write (2. 27. 9-11) “During times, these cities came 
to such perfection and welfare, that they were connected not only in friendship and 
alliances, but they had the same laws, the same measures and currency and common 
archons (government officials), members of the Boule and judges. In general, only 
this point showed that almost the whole of the Peloponnese was not a unique city: Its 
inhabitants were not circumvallated by the same wall, everything else was common 
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and the same for everyone together and for each city-state apart” (our own translation 
from the original text).  
 
2.2  Military Organisation 
The federation disposed of a federal army under the Strategos, organized 
according to that period armies. It comprised heavy infantry in phalanx formations, 
light infantry and cavalry. The federal army consisted of formations provided by the 
city-states and augmented by mercenaries if and when needed. In 217 BC for 
example, the federal forces comprised of 3000 infantry, 300 cavalry, 8000 mercenary 
infantry and 500 mercenary cavalry (Wallbank, 1933; Anderson, 1967; Larsen, 1971).
 An individual as commander of the naval forces of the federation is also 
attested. Many of the constituting city-states of the federation, like Corinth, Sikyon, 
Epidaurus had a long-standing and strong naval tradition. 
 
2.3 Economic organization 
 
  We have less information about the economic organization of the federation 
than about its political, so that in order to answer even tentatively some crucial 
questions, we will advance a few conjectures. The federation was a monetary union 
like today’s European Monetary Union (EMU), with the difference that it was a 
multicurrency area: There was a parallel circulation of federal coins and city-state 
coins, as attested by archaeological findings (see Caspari, 1917, Thompson, 1939). 
 This raises a number of questions: What was the analogy of federal to city-
state coins? To this, no answer can be given. Who was responsible for the minting of 
coins? We assume that there were city-state and federal mints, working in the city-
states and the capital. We further assume that the federal coins were linked to 
payments of the federal budget, as for the federal army and navy, federal 
administration, federal buildings in Aegion etc.      
 An analogy to the EMU is that federal coins had on the one side a head of 
Zeus or Artemis and the inscription ΑΧΑΙΩΝ (meaning, “of the Achaeans”) and on 
the other side, the name of the issuing city-state like AXAIΩΝ-ΑΙΓΕΙΡΑΤΩΝ 
(“Achaeans of Aigira”) like euro coins which bear on the one side the symbol of the 
issuing member-state. This again could mean that federal coins were minted also at 
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city-state mints, on behalf of the federation.      
 A further question refers to the exchange rates: We assume that since all coins 
had silver content, the exchange was made according to the silver value of each coin. 
Then, again we presume the existence of banks that would have undertaken this task, 
in the main member city-states and the capital, Aegion. It is now accepted (Cohen, 
1997) that already during the fourth century Athens had a very developed banking 
system, and that the Greek world was monetized. Thus, we believe that the fourth 
century Athenian experience would have been diffused to the rest of the Greek world, 
especially in areas and city-states like Corinth, which were also important 
international trading centers. On this issue Roberts (2011, p. 130) argues for example,  
that thirty-five hellenistic cities included private banks during the 2
nd 
century BC. 
 Lastly, and very importantly, is the issue of the federal budget, on which we 
know nothing, but whose existence is made clear by the existence of federal coins. 
Such coins indicate the existence of a federal budget, else for what purpose should 
they have been issued? We assume as stated above, that the federal budget covered 
federal army, federal administration and buildings expenses, and perhaps a few 
extraordinary expenses, like public federal festivals. Since the rise of the army and 
navy were variable, the size of budget must have varied too.    
 We will attempt at least an estimate of the military expenditure based on 
known army size for some years, to give at least an order of magnitude for the budget, 
bearing in mind that military expenditure was the major federal budget item: 
According to ancient sources (Loomis, 1998) the daily wage of soldiers during the 3
rd
 
century must have been 1.5 drachmae, and for cavalryman (including fodder) perhaps 
5 (Arvanitides and Kyriazis 2012; Pritchard, 2012).     
 The 217 BC federal army comprised in total 11.000 infantry and 800 cavalry, 
thus a total of 20.500 drachmae per day, or 615.000 per month, or about 100 talents, 
(one talent equals 6000 drachmae). Assuming an eight month campaign period per 
year excluding winter, the total military cost for this year would have been 800 
talents, a very substantial sum for the period. Even if we assume that all the other 
federal items came to about 100 talents, we arrive at a total federal budget estimate of 
900 talents, which is a very substantial sum, comparable to the Athenian budget with a 
revenue of 1200 talents in the 330’s during the time that Lycurgus was tamias (eg. 
finance minister, Kyriazis, 2009). This sum must have represented also a substantial 
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percentage of the, unknown size, federation’s total GDP, but certainly much more than 
the 0.95% of the current EU’s GDP represented by the EU budget. 
 We know nothing also about the revenue side of the federal budget, but we 
will advance based on the analysis of Kyriazis (2009) some hypothesis taking as a 
benchmark the Athenian 4
th
 century budget. Revenue sources must have been: a) city-
state contributions: The existence of federal coins minted in the city-states mints is 
such an indication: Possibly, the city-states gave their contributions by minting in 
their own mints coins which they then forwarded to the federal budget. b) custom 
duties levied on exports, imports, as was the case in ancient Athens, in the port of 
Piraeus, where the rate was 2% on value. We do not know if this is the case in fact, 
but it is a possibility, especially if we assume the existence of an internal market, as 
we will discuss next. c) Military plunder: We assume, that military plunder during 
successful expeditions against enemies would accrue to the federal budget. 
  It seems that the possibility of plundering during war campaigns must have 
been very common during ancient times. De Laix (1973, p. 60), based on Polybius 
(4.5.1) argues that the troops of a neighbor state to the Achaean federation, the 
Aetolian one, were accustomed to plundering. d) Liturgies.
4
 Again, we know nothing 
about it, but it might be possible, that some kind of trierarchy existed for the fleet’s 
warships, inspired by the Athenian example.  A last issue we raise here, is if and to 
what extent, the federation was not only a monetary union, but also an economic one. 
 Again, we have limited evidence, but the indication we possess, permit us to 
advance tentative answers: The existence of monetary union and the circulation of 
parallel currencies are evidence of free mobility of capital within the federation. The 
existence of isopoliteia for citizens is very strong evidence for the free circulation of 
labour. If a citizen of one member city-state has free political rights in another, then 
presumably he can settle and work there. Thus two of the main pillars of today’s EU, 
free circulation of capital and labour existed already in the Achaean federation. 
 The harmonization of measures and standards as attested in the passage of 
                                                          
4
 Liturgies were a very special type of taxation and service levied on rich Athenians, as for example 
trierarchy (See Gabrielsen, 1994). Under this, a wealthy Athenian undertook the running expenses (not 
wage costs) for the upkeep of a trireme warship for a year, of which he undertook also command. 
Being its commander in battle, the trierarch had a strong incentive to have a well-kept ship, since his 
own survival depended on this. 
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Polybius above, is an indication for the existence of free circulation of goods, and the 
existence of an internal market. These measures make sense only in order to 
implement such an internal market, else why introduce them? Thus, it seems that all 
three basic freedoms of modern federations were already present in the Achaean one.
 In the above section we have raised more questions than we could provide 
specific answers, due to a lack of evidence. Still, since these particular questions have 
been raised by us know, we hope that they will be a useful contribution for the start of 
research on these topics. Picture 1 depicts simultaneously the two mostly organized 
ancient Greek federations, (Achaean and Aetolian), two neighboring political entities 
in mainland Greece and northern Peloponnese.  
 
Picture 1The Achaean and Aetolian federations during 222 BC  
 
Source: http://etc.usf.edu/maps/pages/6100/6136/6136.htm 
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The institutional set up of federations: A comparison. 
 
Since the institutional setup of the EU and India is relatively well-known, we 
will present the main institutions in Table 1. Many would not consider the EU as 
being a true federation, with some reason, since the EU lacks a Constitution
5
 and a 
European citizenship. But the European Founding Fathers, A. Spinelli, R. Schuman 
and J Monnet had as their ideal the transformation of the then European Common 
Market (of 1957) into a European federation. Spinelli, underlined the ideal of a 
democratic federation while Monet put forward the ideal of a European federation 
making Europe a common economic unit.       
 
Democratisation and cohesion and their 8 evaluation sub-criteria’s  
a) Democratisation 
 
 In today’s world the issue of how democratic a state (whether federal or not) 
is, gains again in importance, in view, for example, of rising undemocratic behaviour 
of some governments, political instability, euroscepticism, the rise of extremist parties 
etc. 
According to the Freedom Houses report for 2013
6
, democracy has retreated 
for the eighth consecutive year: in 54 countries, democracy has decreased as against 
40 countries in which it has advanced. To evaluate democratisation, eg. how 
democratic a federation is, we propose four criteria used in ancient classic 
democracies, out of which the first three apply to all types of democracy, while the 
fourth is specific to federations. The four criteria are isonomia (equality in front of the 
law), isegoria (equality to propose initiatives), isokratia (equality of political rights) 
and isopoliteia (single citizenship, freedom to transfer political rights from one federal 
constituting state to another).  
 Isonomia preceded democracy in ancient Greece, having been already present 
in some city-states by the 7
th
 century BC, before the first attested democracies (end of 
                                                          
5
 The European Constitution was voted down in some national referenda such as in France and the 
Netherlands. 
6
http://www.freedomhouse.org/article/freedom-world-2013-middle-east-gains-provoke-intensified-
repression#.U24E-3Z7TxU, Retrieved, May 10, 2014. 
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the 6
th
 century, Athens 510-507 BC).
7
 Isegoria was regarded as the cornerstone of 
ancient Greek direct democracy. Under this, any citizen could propose before the 
citizens’ Assembly, the supreme decision making body, a decree or law on any issue, 
ranging from alliances, declaration of war (foreign policy) to currency and economic 
issues.
8
 The Assembly then voted, and if the proposals garnered a majority of votes, it 
became law. In modern democracies isegoria takes the form of popular initiatives 
leading, if they unite a sufficient number of signatures, to obligatory referendums with 
binding outcomes (Cronin, 1999; Matsuaka, 2005). 
 Isokrateia means equality of political rights, eg., the right to vote and to be 
elected in all state positions. Isokrateia was achieved in all democracies gradually, 
since in the beginning voting rights were linked to wealth and gender criteria. 
Athenians achieved full equality of political rights by the 460's BCE, while women 
only after World War I and in some cases, as in Switzerland, after World War II. For 
the present purpose, we extend the criterion of isokrateia to denote the citizens’ 
involvement in choosing/electing state officials at all levels and all positions of the 
federation. In our new definition, isokrateia is also a procedural criterion denoting 
electoral procedures, for example, is the head of state elected or not? 
 Isopoliteia, (single citizenship), applying to federations means that a citizen of 
one member-state (city-state in ancient Greece) has full political rights at the member-
state level if he moves from one member-state of the federation to another. This 
applied to the ancient federations, (Mackil, 2013) to most modern ones like the USA, 
Canada, India, Switzerland, etc., but not to the European Union.  A Portuguese citizen 
who establishes himself in Germany does not automatically acquire the right to vote 
in German federal level elections, eg., for the Chancellor and the Bundestag, although 
he acquires this right for local, city-level elections after residing for a certain length of 
                                                          
7
 Legal equality of citizens is regarded as being self-evident in modern democracies, but it is not. The 
Greek constitution for example distinguishes in an article “on ministers responsibilities” legal rights of 
ministers, which are different from those of ordinary citizens. Under this ministers are exempted from 
persecution in some cases, for which ordinary citizens are not. 
8
 Examples are Themistocles Naval Law of 482 BC, under which the Athenians decided to use the 
proceedings of the Lavrion silver mines to finance the construction of 200 trireme warships during two 
years, on which victory at the naval battle of Salamis in 480 BC against the Persians depended 
(Kyriazis and Zouboulakis, 2004) and Nicophon's monetary law of 375 BC on the circulation of 
parallel currencies (Engen, 2005; Ober, 2008; Kyriazis, 2012). 
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time.  
 
b) Cohesion 
 While democritisation covers the political set-up of federations, cohesion 
addresses mainly economic issues. We propose four sub-criteria under cohesion: a) 
Monetary union b) Fiscal union and the size of the federal budget c) Regulation and 
the existence of a common market d) common external and defence policy. Common 
external and defence policy is of course also a political issue, but we consider it under 
cohesion because in democratisation we have included criteria which concern the 
working of democracy. Also, as shown in the following tables, the existence or not of 
common defence has a substantial economic effect on the federal budget. Up to the 
20
th
 century, defence spending was the main expenditure item on the federal level, as 
we have estimated for the Achaean federation.
9
   
 
 
The institutional setup of federations: A comparison 
 
 Due to space limitations, we present the institutional framework of the three 
federations in Table 1, and our findings and evaluation in Table 2. Table 1 presents a 
general overview of a series of institutional settlements of the Greek proto-federation 
in comparison to India and the EU, which we consider as to be of major importance in 
order for a political entity to be characterized as a federation. It shows that the Greek 
proto-federation had established an institutional framework of values and principles 
(such as political democratic structures, a regime of equal political rights, common 
foreign policy, common currency and common federal justice).    
 All three cases present democratic political structures, provide for the 
safeguarding of political rights and justice. Except India which has one federal 
currency, the rupee, the other two cases possess a “mixed” system of usage of both 
local and federal coins. When it comes to the EU, the euro, which is under the aegis of 
the European Union Central Bank (ECB) cannot be considered yet a “federal 
currency”. It is in usage only by the 18 Eurozone member-states.     
                                                          
9
 Davids and t' Hart (2012) have estimated defence spending for the United Provinces (Dutch Republic, 
a federation of the 17
th
 century) as 87% of the federal budget for 1641.  
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Table 1: A comparative analysis of the institutional framework of the Aetolian federation in relation to 
India and the EU.  
State 
Member 
states/pro
vinces 
Capital 
Main institutional organs intended for 
taking political decision and executive 
power 
Regime of 
equal 
political 
rights 
(“isopoliteia” 
Common 
Foreign and 
Defence Policy 
Local and 
federal 
coins 
Federal 
justice 
Achaean 
Federation 
? Aegion 
Local Assemblies (Ecclesiae) + Federal 
Assembly (Thermika and Panaetolika) 
 
Federal Council and Apoklitoi  
 
Strategos (General)   
 
[Hipparch , Public Secreraty,  7 Τamiai] 
 
7 Boularchs and 7Epilektarchs 
▼ 
 
▼ 
 
LC+FC ▼ 
India 
28 states 
and 7 
territories  
New 
Delhi 
President and Vice- President 
 
Prime Minister + Council of Ministers 
 
 
2 Houses of  Parliament  
 
Rajya Sabha (Senate) -245 members 
[233 represents states and union 
territories] 
[12 nominated by the President] 
 
Lok Sabha [545 elected locally 
members] 
          ▼ ▼ 
 
 
FC 
 
Reserve 
Bank of 
India (RBI) 
 
Indian 
Central 
Bank 
 
 
▼     
Supreme 
Constituti
onal  
 
18 High 
Courts  
 
 
 
 
 
EU 
 
 
 
28* 
 
 
 
Brussels* 
European Parliament 
 
Council of Ministers  
 
European Summit (heads of state and  
governments) 
 
European Commission 
 
 
- 
 
 
* 
CFSP 
 
EU 
Battlegroups 
 
 
(LC+FC) 
 
(ECB) 
 
 
 
 
▼ 
Court of 
Justice of 
the EU 
Explanations: 
LC = local coin ;  FC = federal coin 
▼ : institution in force  
* : institution in development 
Source: Interactive analysis based on the findings of  Caspari (1917), Mitsos (1947), Larsen (1952), 
Granger (1999), Scholten (2000), Mackil, 2013, Economou and Kyriazis (2013) and Economou, 
Kyriazis and Metaxas (under preparattion)  for the Achaean federation and the EU. 
 
 
Finally, the Greek federation and India may be regarded as superior to the EU 
as far as foreign policy and defence issues are concerned. The Achaean federation 
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introduced common administration, common and parallel currencies, common 
defense and external policy in practice (thus, going further than today’s EU with its 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the “tools” of achieving this, the 
Eurocorps and the EU Battlegroups), federal court of justice, and isopoliteia (eg. a 
citizen of a city-state having citizen’s rights in the other city-states, a situation that 
does not exist in the EU at present but exists for India). 
Table 2 shows that, concerning democratization, the Achaean federation 
fulfilled all four criteria, applying direct democracy at all federal levels. Concerning 
India and the EU equality in front of the law is in practice. However concerning the 
second sub-criterion of initiatives at the federal level as far as India is concerned, the 
practical implementation of the process of referendums and initiatives for a variety of 
potential issues is still in the open. Taking the above into consideration, we evaluate 
the criterion of “isegoria” for India still as “limited”. The EU, on the other hand, 
having no provision for initiatives whose results are legally binding and no provisions 
for the transfer of full political rights from one state to the other, fulfils only two of 
the four democritisation criteria. Referendums on the other hand have to do only with 
local matters and they don’t have a simultaneous pan-European character and 
prospective.
10
   
 In our extended definition of procedural isokrateia (political equality), the 
Achaean federation ranks first, since all state posts were filled by elections, including 
the General. India, where some of the members of the Senate and the heads of state 
are not elected but appointed, ranks a little bit lower. The EU/EMU where up to now 
the President, the President of the Commission, the members of the Councils of 
Ministers etc. are not elected, would rank a distant third.
11
 Thus, we denote this in 
table 2 as “in part”, meaning that EU citizens have equal political rights when voting 
for the European Parliament elections, but no political rights concerning the non-
                                                          
10
 The Lisbon Treaty provides for the first time the possibility of initiatives at European level, if one 
million signatures are gathered. But the outcome of the vote is not legally binding. 
11
 In fact, only the members of the European Parliament (EP) are elected, but its powers are still 
limited, although increasing. For example, the EP shares the legislative power with the Council of 
Ministers. We are of course aware, that in the case of Canada, we simplify, because we do not take into 
account the actual responsibilities of elected versus not elected bodies, with non-elected having less 
responsibilities in decision making. The issue could be refined by attributing “political” weights to each 
body. 
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elected EU officials. 
 
Table 2: A comparative analysis between the Achaean federation, India and the EU concerning the  two 
main institutional criteria (democratization and cohesion)   
Criteria 
 i) Democratisation 
Federation 
“Isonomia” 
(equality in front of 
the law) 
“Isegoria” 
(equality to propose 
initiatives) 
“Isokrateia” 
(political 
equality) 
“Isopoliteia” 
(transfer of political rights of a 
citizen from state to state) 
Achaean 
Federation 
yes yes yes yes 
India yes limited yes, with some 
limitations 
yes 
EU yes no only in part no 
ii) Cohesion 
 Monetary Union FU and budget Common market and 
regulation  
Common external and Defense 
Policy 
Achaean 
Federation 
yes yes yes yes 
India yes Yes yes yes 
EU yes (18 members of 
the EMU) 
very low budget yes no 
 
 
Furthermore, as far as the second main criterion is concerned, cohesion, as it 
can be seen from table 2, the Achaean federation had a monetary union (federal 
coins), a type of fiscal union (FU), meaning own resources for the federal budget and 
a big federal budget due to common defense, although extant sources do not allow us 
to give exact numbers.
12
 India fulfills also all four criteria for cohesion. The Indian 
federal budget for 2013-14 period is 280 billion, or 12.4% of GDP 
(http://www.indiabudget.nic.in/es2013-14/echap-03.pdf), while the EU budget is 
about only 1% of total EU GDP, in distant contrast for example with the 20.8% of 
GDP concerning the USA for 2013. 
However, India and the EU cover the third sub-criterion, common market  (in 
this case we are referring to the European Economic and Monetary Union states, the 
                                                          
12
 In Economou and Kyriazis (2013) we have attempted to analyse these issues. See also Mackil (2013, 
chapter 5). 
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so-called eurozone members) fulfills only two. However, there is, as yet, no fiscal 
union at European level, and the federal budget, at about 1% of total EU GDP is very 
small. Furthermore, as for the last sub-criterion of cohesion, there is, as yet, no 
European external and defence policy.
13
 
 
Conclusion 
The criteria we have suggested for an evaluation of federations are important, 
because taken together they can offer a basis for the durability of federations. The 
more democratic (and thus legitimate in the eyes of their citizens) and cohesive (and 
thus indicating higher community of interest and common welfare) the more durable a 
federation will be (or was).        
 The Greek proto-federations each lasted more than 250 years, as against for 
example Czechoslovakia’s only 45 years (1945-1990), the Soviet Union’s 68 (1922-
1990) or the EU’s just 1214 (2002-2014) which already shows signs of stress and 
India’s 67 (1947, or 1949-2014). Since all four criteria of democratization were 
applied in the Achaean federation, if we give one point for full fulfillment for each 
criterion, the Achaean federation totals 4. The EU does not fulfill at all single 
citizenship right of popular initiative, and totals only 1.5 points. As to single 
citizenship, European citizenship does not yet exist. (it would exist in the framework 
of the European Constitution, which has not been adopted).    
 A Portuguese citizen who, for example, resides in Germany, does not get 
automatically the right to vote for German national elections, a right that an Achaean 
citizen had. A citizen of the city-state of Patras, had the right to vote in the popular 
assembly of the city-state of Corinth, both city-states being members of the 
federation. The Treaty of Lisbon provides the possibility of European referenda after 
gathering one million signatures. But the resuets have only a advisory character, they 
are not binding. Thus, there is no trace of direct democracy in the EU.  
 European citizens have equal voting rights in European Parliament elections, 
but since the heads of all other institutions (eg. European President, European Foreign 
                                                          
13
 Halkos and Kyriazis (2006) have proposed the benchmark of  “Optimal tax area” to analyse this. For 
the European external and defense policy see Metaxas and Economou (2012). 
14
 The European Union was established in 2002 together with the European Monetary Union (EMU) 
which comprises now 19 out of its 28 EU members 
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Minister, President of the Commission, President of the European Central Bank, 
Presidents of the various Councils of Ministers), are appointed by governments, or 
after May 2014 voted also by the European Parliament, European citizens cannot be 
elected to these post through a direct election as was the case in the Achaean 
federation.           
 India fulfills the criteria of equality in front of the law. Single citizenship is 
fulfilled with some exceptions regarding the eight north-eastern states, together with 
Jammu, Kashmir, and the hill states of Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand, which are 
classified as special category states. According to Article 371 of the Constitution 
provisions, these include restriction of the ownership and transfer of land on non-
residents to the state (Singh, 2008, p. 21). These constitute violations of the basic 
principles of the movement of labour and capital, basic principles not only in the 
federations but also a Common Market as the EU was in its establishment in 1957. 
 Restrictions on non-residents attenuates single-citizenship. India does not have 
the right of popular initiatives, thus as in the EU, no direct democracy. As to equal 
political rights, Indians do have equality of voting rights at federal, stated and local 
level. But since the President is not elected by universal voting but through an 
electoral college consisting of elected members of both Houses of Parliament and the 
Legislative Assemblies of the states, political equality is somewhat attenuated. Since 
the 233 (out of 245) members of the second chamber, Rajya Sabha, are elected by the 
elected Legislative Assemblies (and the rest 12 are appointed by the President) in a 
“two-tier electional system”, political equality is again somewhat attenuated. 
 Indian citizens cannot vote and cannot be candidates for the Rajya Sabha 
elections, something which of course applies to other federations, like the US Senate 
(Arora 2010). Thus, on the democratization criterion, India would total between 2-2.5 
points.  Concerning cohesion, the Achaean federation fulfilled all four sub-criteria. We 
do not have extant information as to the federal budget as percentage of GDP, which 
is a rough quantitative approximation of the federal policies that promote cohesion. 
On the other hand, as in all pre-modern states, defense was the main item of federal 
expenditure, and knowing from ancient sources the strengths of the land and naval 
forces of the federations, which were substantial, we conclude that the federal military 
18 
 
budget was high.
15
         
 The EU again lags behind in these sub-criteria. The EU budget is very low, at 
about 1% of EU GDP, clearly insufficient to provide a European regional and social 
policy with enough means for these policies. European solidarity cannot substantially 
be promoted. European citizens, especially in the Southern states (Spain, Portugal, 
Italy, Greece, Cyprus but also Ireland and France) have the impression of being 
imposed by the EU harsh austerity measures, reducing growth available incomes and 
increasing unemployment.
16
 Taken together for many European citizens, this is a 
manifestation of a lack of community of interest.    
 India fulfills with a few exceptions the cohesion sub-criteria. One is the 
exemption of the northern states from the free movement of labour and capital 
mentioned above. A problem concerning cohesion, is as in other federation, increased 
regional inequality (Singh, et al. 2003; Singh and Srinivasan, 2006). An issue raised 
(Singh, 2008) is whether federal fiscal transfers are sufficient, linked to tax 
competition, between the states that influence direct investment, are sufficient to 
combat inequality.        
 Indian federal budget is 12,4 % of GDP as against 15% in Canada and 25% in 
the USA in 2013. The ancient Greek federations were bottom-up voluntarily ones. 
City-states joined voluntarily, after a vote in the popular assembly in the city-state in 
favour of joining and a vote in the assembly of the federation to be accepted or not.
17
 
The Greek federations, applying direct democracy and its four principles at all levels, 
were more democratic than most present federations, with the exception of the Swiss. 
Thus, they enjoyed a very high degree of legitimization by their citizens (the opposite 
to the present day EU) which was the base for their durability. The citizens of the 
Greek federations, and more specifically, in our case the Achaean one, were willing to 
                                                          
15
 We have estimated (Economou and Kyriazis, 2013) that the federal budget of the Achaean federation 
could be approximately 900 talents for some years, a very substantial sum. A talent was the equivalent 
of 6000 drachmae, when during the 4
th
 century BCE, the daily remuneration if a skilled worker or a 
mercenary soldier was about 1.5 drachmae. 
16
 For example, during 2009-2014 GDP fell by 25% available income 40% and unemployment 
increased in 27% in Greece. 
17
 Not all federations are formed on a voluntarily bottom-up procedure, as was the case of the Soviet 
Union. In India, explicit military force was used to annex the state of Hyderabad into the union (Singh, 
2008), and as the American Civil War demonstrates, states are not always free to secede.   
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fight to preserve them, because they perceived a community of interest, and an 
increased personal welfare from belonging to them.
18
    
 Thus, our policy suggestions for the EU, if it is to progress towards becoming 
a true federation, is to introduce more democratization in the form of binding popular 
initiatives (direct democracy) and the direct election of its political leadership. To 
increase cohesion, a common external policy-defence policy must be implemented, 
linked to a higher European budget for regional and social policy, issues that are not 
easy to solve.          
 As for India, the introduction of direct democracy elements (binding referenda 
after popular initiatives) should be considered, as being practiced in more and more 
countries, like the USA, Brazil, Uruguay, Switzerland, Germany New Zealand, 
Australia etc.  
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